首页> 外文OA文献 >De Gaulle and European integration: historical revision and social science theory. CES Germany Europe Working Papers, no.8.5, May 2008
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De Gaulle and European integration: historical revision and social science theory. CES Germany Europe Working Papers, no.8.5, May 2008

机译:戴高乐与欧洲一体化:历史修正与社会科学理论。 CEs德国和欧洲工作论文,2008年5月8日

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摘要

The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle’s policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, political scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General’s distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by the four major decisions toward European integration taken under de Gaulle’s Presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Fouchet Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the “empty chair” crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in “Luxembourg Compromise.” In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence— speeches, memoirs, or government documents—suggests that de Gaulle’s primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interested in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations—even in the “least likely” case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leader’s geopolitical ideology—even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primarysource research.
机译:无论是历史学家,政治学家还是评论家,成千上万的有关戴高乐对欧洲一体化政策的书籍和文章,无论是历史学家,政治学家还是评论家,都普遍认为,将军对通用将军独特的地缘意识形态具有重要的解释重要性。在解释他的动机时,只有次要意义(如果有的话)才附加到商业考虑上。本文旨在通过戴高乐总统任期内对欧洲一体化的四项重大决定来扭转这种历史上的共识:1958年保留在共同市场的决定,1960年代初提出的Fouchet计划,否决英国加入欧共体的决定,并引发1965-1966年的“空椅子”危机,导致“卢森堡妥协”。在每种情况下,绝大多数主要证据(演讲,回忆录或政府文件)都建议戴高乐的主要动机是经济的,而不是地缘政治的或意识形态的。像他的前任和继任者一样,戴高乐寻求通过为其出口产品建立受保护的市场来促进法国的工业和农业发展。这一经验发现具有三个更广泛的含义:(1)对于那些对欧盟感兴趣的人,它表明区域一体化主要是出于经济而非地缘政治的考虑,即使在“最不可能的”情况下也是如此。 (2)对于那些对思想在外交政策中的作用感兴趣的人来说,这表明,民主国家中强大的利益集团限制了领导人的地缘政治意识形态的影响,即使执行官具有非常广泛的机构自治权。戴高乐首先是一位民主政治家,其次是思想上有远见的人。 (3)对于那些采用定性案例研究方法的人来说,它表明,即使是广泛的,具有代表性的二手资料样本也不能为因果推断提供坚实的基础。对于政治科学家和历史学家而言,在许多情况下,没有可靠的替代方法可以替代原始资源研究。

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    Moravcsik Andrew.;

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