Experience and morality : Buddhist ethics as moral phenomenology

摘要

This dissertation comprises two main sections. The first section, comprising Chapters 2udand 3, addresses the methodological problems with seeking to understand Buddhist ethicsudthrough categorizing it into a Western ethical system. Since Buddhist ethics has often beenudinterpreted as either a type of consequentialism or a type of virtue ethics, Chapter 2 is devoted toudaddressing the problems with a consequentialist reading of Buddhist ethics, and Chapter 3 toudhighlighting the structural differences that inhibit a faithful reading of Buddhist ethics as a typeudof virtue ethics. In the second section, consisting of of Chapters 4 and 5, I argue that whenudBuddhist ethical writings are considered on their own terms, there emerges a recurrent anduddominant emphasis on the phenomenology of moral acts. Chapter 4 draws on Buddhistudpsychological texts to elucidate the Buddhist explanation of the foundational components ofudexperience and the way in which these are ethically significant. Chapter 5 looks at Buddhistudethical texts to demonstrate that mental states are prioritized in ethical discussions and that bothudthe Buddhist moral problem and moral solution pertain to the way we see and experience theudworld.udSince Goodman has argued most extensively that Buddhist ethics is best understood as audkind of universalist consequentialism, Chapter 2 begins with an examination of Goodman’sudmethodology and arguments. Goodman identifies an agent-neutral approach as the centraludcharacteristic of a consequentialist ethical system, the characteristic that differentiates it fromudsystems of virtue ethics, which are agent-relative. He interprets themes within Buddhist textsudsuch as the promotion of self-sacrifice and the dedication of merit as evidence of the agentudneutral approach of a consequentialist ethical system. I aim to demonstrate that these examplesudshould be read as moral instructions for the agent’s motivational state rather than evidenceudsupporting that Buddhist ethics is a type of consequentialism. In doing so, I intend touddemonstrate that Goodman’s methodology of confining the inquiry into Buddhist ethics to itsudcategorization as one of two Western ethical systems based on the criteria of Western ethicaludthought limits the possibility for a comprehensive understanding of Buddhist ethics.udI then turn to arguments made by Goodman, Williams, and Siderits specifically in regardudto Śāntideva. These scholars each contend that Śāntideva’s metaphysical position commits himudto a universalist consequentialist ethics and point to his discussion of the ethical meditativeudpractice of equalizing and exchanging self and other in Chapter 8 of How to Lead an AwakenedudLife as evidence. I will contest the claim that the Buddhist doctrine of selflessness entails theudagent neutrality that characterizes consequentialism. I will argue that Śāntideva’s use of theudmetaphysical doctrine of selflessness within an ethical context does not aim to demonstrate audmoral obligation based on agent neutrality, and thus is not a form of consequentialism. Instead, Iudwill argue that he uses it to effect a psychological shift in the agent for the purposes of moraluddevelopment.udI argue that, in Chapter 8, Śāntideva is simply pointing out the irrationality ofuddistinguishing pains based on their owners, together with the possibility for taking on theudconcerns of others as our own, because of the malleable boundaries of the conception of identity.udI contend that, in this section of his treatise, Śāntideva is instructing the practitioner to harnessudthe powerful psychological forces that already exist within our experience, such as the aversionudto our own pain or attachment to our future selves, and extend their scope through expanding theudconception of self, transforming our experience and moral conduct from one motivated by selfconcernudto one centered on concern for others.udAfter arguing that the emphasis on the mental domain of the agent fatally undermines audconsequentialist interpretation of Buddhist ethics, in Chapter 3, I address the virtue ethicsudinterpretation. While it might seem that an emphasis on the mental states of the agent couldudaccord with a form of virtue ethics, I argue that there are structural differences between the twoudsystems that preclude this classification. It is Keown who offers the most detailed account ofudthis position, so using his arguments I engage in a comparative analysis of the structures of virtueudethics and Buddhist ethics. I identify five critical structural features of virtue ethics and argueudthat they do not characterize Buddhist ethics. I will argue that neither the Buddhist account ofudthe relationship between virtues and nirvana nor the Buddhist explanation of moral choice andudagency are consistent with a virtue ethics.udIn the second section, I begin the inquiry into Buddhist ethical writings on their ownudterms. To argue that moral phenomenology is foundational to Buddhist ethical thought, inudChapter 4, I turn first to the Buddhist psychological treatises of Vasubandhu, Asaṅga, andudBuddhaghosa, highlighting the fundamental mental processes that shape experience with the intention of demonstrating that these Buddhist psychology texts provide the foundation forudunderstanding that the way we construct our experience of the world is ethically significant.udIn Chapter 5, I turn to Mahāyāna Buddhist ethical texts to demonstrate how thisudpsychological foundation is used in these texts in the formulation of a moral phenomenology. Iuduse primarily the works of Āryadeva and Śāntideva; I call attention to the fact that these textsudprioritize mental states in their ethical discussions and present a division of two types of moraludperception: the confused way of seeing the world that is characterized by vice and the accurateudway of seeing the world that characterizes virtue. These texts identify the moral problem withudconfusion about reality, and the moral solution as a transformation of the way we experience theudworld through the cultivation of a metaphysically accurate understanding. In the final stage ofudmaking the case for moral phenomenology as central to Buddhist ethical thought, I turn to theudPrajñāparamitā literature, focusing on the Heart Sūtra and Diamond Cutter Sūtra touddemonstrate that in these sūtras we can find the seeds of the ethical system of Āryadeva andudŚāntideva since they also stress the importance of a transformation of vision as the basis ofudethical activity.