Self-Determination and Moral Character: Elements of a Theory of Identification

摘要

Fostering the self-determination of good moral character is a practical problemin need of theoretical insight. The notion of psychic identification, developed in the work of Harry Frankfurt and Gerald Dworkin, holds promise for improving our understanding of self-determination, but the notion has so far been characterized only thinly. I offer some elements of a theory of identification and some practical recommendations for fostering the self-determination of good moral character in that theoretical light. I critically review Frankfurt's philosophical anthropology and propose some enhancements to it. I discuss Dworkin's notion of procedural independence, and recommend an alternative understanding of the privileged nature of the self that identifies. I conceive of the identifying self, at the phenomenological level, as a psychic referee which enjoys an epistemologically privileged position, not an ontologically privileged one. I offer a partial analysis of identification under such a conception as the authoritative, purposive commitment of the self to a particular way of being. Though many views of identification seem to presuppose that it is an explicit process, I maintain that it is often implicit, though it is nevertheless a sort of psychic activity. Identification is shown to ground self-regarding moral emotions. After examining a model of moral education inspired by Daniel Callahan, I suggest that such an approach should be supplemented with experiential learning because such experiential learning can foster morally worthy identification.