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Behavior, Communication, and Assumptions About Other Peoples' Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation.

机译:关于下议院困境中其他民族行为的行为,沟通和假设。

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Two experiments investigated effects of communication on behavior in an 8-person commons dilemma of group versus individual gain. Subjects made a single choice involving a substantial amount of money (possible outcomes ranging from nothing to $10.50). In Experiment 1, 4 communication conditions were crossed with the possibility of losing money (loss, no loss). Subjects chose defecting or cooperating responses and predicted responses of other group members. Results showed defection significantly higher in no communication and irrelevant communication conditions than in relevant communication and relevant communication plus roll call conditions. Loss had no effect on decisions. Defectors expected much more defection than did cooperators. Experiment 2 replicated irrelevant communication and communication effects, and compared predictions of participants with those of observers.

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