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Enforcing trustworthy cloud SLA with witnesses: A game theory–based model using smart contracts

机译:使用证人执取的云SLA:使用智能合同的基于游戏理论的模型

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摘要

There lacks trust between the cloud customer and provider to enforce traditional cloud SLA (Service Level Agreement) where the blockchain technique seems a promising solution. However, current explorations still face challenges to prove that the off‐chain SLO (Service Level Objective) violations really happen before recorded into the on‐chain transactions. In this paper, a witness model is proposed implemented with smart contracts to solve this trust issue. The introduced role, “Witness”, gains rewards as an incentive for performing the SLO violation report, and the payoff function is carefully designed in a way that the witness has to tell the truth, for maximizing the rewards. This fact that the witness has to be honest is analyzed and proved using the Nash Equilibrium principle of game theory. For ensuring the chosen witnesses are random and independent, an unbiased selection algorithm is proposed to avoid possible collusions. An auditing mechanism is also introduced to detect potential malicious witnesses. Specifically, we define three types of malicious behaviors and propose quantitative indicators to audit and detect these behaviors. Moreover, experimental studies based on Ethereum blockchain demonstrate the proposed model is feasible, and indicate that the performance, ie, transaction fee, of each interface follows the design expectations.
机译:云客户和提供商之间缺乏信任来强制执行传统的云SLA(服务级别协议),其中区块链技术似乎是有希望的解决方案。然而,目前的探索仍然面临挑战,以证明在录制进入连锁交易之前确实发生的违规的SLO(服务级别目标)违规。在本文中,提出了一个证人模型,通过智能合同实施,以解决这种信任问题。介绍的作用“见证”,获得奖励作为执行SLO违规报告的激励,并以证人讲述真相的方式精心设计,以便最大化奖励。这一事实,证明必须诚实地分析并使用纳什均衡原理进行了分析,并证明了博弈论。为了确保所选择的证人是随机的和独立的,提出了一种非偏见的选择算法以避免可能的勾结。还引入了审计机制来检测潜在的恶意证人。具体而言,我们定义了三种类型的恶意行为,并提出了定量指标来审核和检测这些行为。此外,基于Etereum区块链的实验研究证明了所提出的模型是可行的,并且表明每个界面的性能,即交易费用遵循设计期望。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Concurrency and computation: practice and experience》 |2021年第14期|e5511.1-e5511.15|共15页
  • 作者单位

    Informatics Institute University of Amsterdam Amsterdam The Netherlands|School of Computer Science National University of Defense Technology Changsha China;

    School of Computer Science National University of Defense Technology Changsha China|School of Electronic Sciences National University of Defense Technology Changsha China;

    School of Computer Science National University of Defense Technology Changsha China;

    Informatics Institute University of Amsterdam Amsterdam The Netherlands;

    Informatics Institute University of Amsterdam Amsterdam The Netherlands|Zhiming Zhao Informatics Institute University of Amsterdam 1012 XH Amsterdam The Netherlands.;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    blockchain; cloud computing; game theory; service level agreement; smart contract;

    机译:区块链;云计算;博弈论;服务级别协议;智能合同;

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