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On The Price Of Anarchy For Non-atomic Congestion Games Under Asymmetric Cost Maps And Elastic Demands

机译:非对称成本图和弹性需求下非原子拥塞博弈的无政府状态价格

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We derive several bounds for the price of anarchy of the noncooperative congestion games with elastic demands and asymmetric linear or nonlinear cost functions. The bounds established depend on a constant from the cost functions as well as the ratio between user benefit and social surplus at Nash equilibrium. The results can be viewed a generalization of that of Chau and Sim [C.K. Chau, K.M. Sim, The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands, Operations Research Letters 31 (2003) 327-334] for the symmetric case, or a generalization of Perakis [G. Perakis, The price of anarchy when costs are nonseparable and asymmetric, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3064 (2004) 46-58] to the elastic demand.
机译:我们得出具有弹性需求和不对称线性或非线性成本函数的非合作式拥挤博弈的无政府状态价格的几个界限。建立的界限取决于成本函数的常数以及纳什均衡时用户收益与社会剩余之间的比率。结果可以看做是Chau和Sim [C.K.周锦Sim,具有对称成本图和弹性需求的非原子拥塞游戏的无政府状态价格,对称情况下的Operations Research Letters 31(2003)327-334]或Perakis的推广[G. Perakis,当成本不可分割且不对称时的无政府状态价格,计算机科学讲座笔记3064(2004)46-58]。

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