权力结构与促销策略下的双重选择均衡及福利分析

摘要

Based on transfer of wholesale pricing power,the article firstly studies the effect of transfer of pricing power,promotional strategies and consumer loyalty on equilibrium results of competing channels under three power structures.Then,it analyzes equilibrium of dual selection under power structures and promotional strategies.Finally,it studies the effect of consumer loyalty,promotional sensitivity and power structure on consumer surplus and social welfare.The study shows that in three power structures,regardless of whether promotional strategies is introduced,the power retailer will get more profits than the competitor because of transfer of pricing power.Manufacturers can share some of the power retailer' s profits with the weak retailer through promotional transfer in MS power structure,while all of channel members can achieve win-win effect in RS power structure.When consumer promotional sensitivity is high,double equilibrium may occur in double choice.An increase of consumer loyalty will lower consumer surplus and social welfare,while the introduction of promotional strategies will improve social welfare,which may not improve consumer surplus.%在批发价格定价权转移条件下,首先研究定价权转移、促销策略以及消费者忠诚度对三种权力结构下竞争渠道均衡结果的影响,然后分析基于权力结构与促销策略的双重选择均衡,最后探讨消费者忠诚度、促销敏感度以及权力结构对消费者剩余和社会福利的影响.研究表明:在三种权力结构下,不管是否引入促销策略,定价权转移使得强势零售商比竞争对手获得更多利润；在MS权力结构下,制造商和弱势零售商通过促销转移共同分享强势零售商部分利润,而在RS权力结构下,促销转移使得渠道成员达到“共赢效应”；当消费者促销敏感度较高时,双重选择可能会出现双均衡；消费者忠诚度的增加降低了消费者剩余和社会福利,而引入促销策略将提高社会福利,但未必能够提高消费者剩余.