在对大股东类型做出界定的基础上，本文通过构建“大股东类型一实际控制权配置模式一控制权私人收益”分析框架，理论分析了大股东类型与大股东控制权私人收益的关系。选取了我国上市公司发生的共231项涉及控制权转移的大宗股权转让交易为研究样本，实证考察了我国上市公司的大股东类型与大股东控制权私人收益的关系。实证结果表明：1．国有资产管理机构攫取的控制权私人收益显著为负；2．国有企业攫取的控制权私人收益近似为零；3．民营企业攫取的控制权私人收益显著为正；4．国有资产管理机构攫取的控制权私人收益最小，国有企业居中，而民营企业最大。%Starting from identifying the types of large shareholders, this paper presents an analysis framework consisting of types of large shareholders, allocation of real control rights and private benefits of control rights, so as to theoretically probe into their internal relationship. Taking the total 231 transactions involving controlling right transfer of China＇ s listed companies, this paper empirically tests the relationship between types of large shareholders and private benefits of control rights. Following is a brief summary to the research results. 1. Private benefits of control rights expropriated by state asset - management bureaus （SAMB） are significantly negative. 2. The private benefits of control rights expropriated by state - owned enterprises （SOE） are near to zero. 3. The private benefits of control rights expropriated by private enterprises（PE）are significantly positive. 4. Private bene- fits of control rights expropriated by state asset- management bureaus （SAMB） are the smallest, next to state -owned enterpri- ses （SOE） , with the private enterprises（PE） being the largest.
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