大股东控制、信息披露与控制权私人收益研究

摘要

控制权私人收益作为大股东与中小股东之间利益冲突体现,是各国上市公司普遍存在的基本委托代理问题,而信息披露是缓解这一代理冲突的重要机制之一。本文以深市所有A股2006—2010年间发生控制权转移事件的上市公司为样本,考察了大股东控制、信息披露因素对控制权转移过程中大股东获取控制权私人收益规模的影响。研究表明,大股东控制力度越大,控制权私人收益规模越大,而在我国目前投资者法律保护不完善的背景下,信息披露作为公司治理的重要机制之一,能在一定程度上缓解大股东对中小投资者的利益侵占。%The private benefits of control embody the conflict of interests between large shareholders and small shareholders,which is a basic principal-agent problem of the listed companies of almost all the countries.However,information disclosure is one of the most important mechanisms to alleviate the agency problem.The paper made an empirical study of the listed companies of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange（SZSE） between 2006 and 2010,and explored how major shareholder control and information disclosure influenced the scale of private benefits of control when the control of A-shares changed.Studies show that the greater is the major shareholder control,the larger are the private benefits of control.The legal protection of investors is imperfect in China,so information disclosure,as one of the most important mechanisms of corporate governance,can lessen major shareholders＇ infringement of small and medium investors＇ interests to some extent.