It is widely assumed that any satisfactory account of truth has to accept all (or nearly all) instances of the following T-schema: it is true that p if and only if p. Hence any argument showing the incompatibility of a given account of truth with this schema would be damaging for the account in question. Incompatibility arguments are sometimes directed against the epistemic conception of truth, for which truth is some sort of idealized rational justifiability or warranted assertibility. An intriguing argument of that kind has been recently put forward by William Alston. The aim of the paper is to discuss and undermine Alston's argument.
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机译：人们普遍认为，对真理的任何令人满意的解释都必须接受以下T形图的所有（或几乎所有）实例：的确，p仅当且仅当p成立。因此，任何表明给定的事实说明与该模式不兼容的论点都将损害所讨论的说明。不相容的论点有时是针对真理的认知概念的，对真理而言，真理是某种理想化的理性辩护或有保证的主张。 William Alston最近提出了一种有趣的论点。本文的目的是讨论并破坏奥尔斯顿的观点。
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