A Social and Economic Analysis of Professional Regulation in Optometry

摘要

Two major issues are addressed, using the occupation of optometry as a case: (1) how is professional regulatory power gained by a health occupation, and (2) what are the costs and benefits of professional regulation to the public. The authors find that political resources are important in determining the degree of professional regulation achieved by optometry. For instance, optometry is more likely to achieve its regulatory goals where its size relative to other vision care occupations is high and in states with less competitive party systems, less innovative legislatures, and higher turnover of legislators. Four professional regulations raise the average price of an eye examination by 32 percent, controlling for characteristics of the services provided. Regulations lower the marginal prices for extra quality, but extra quality produced in restrictive states is not valued as highly as its social cost. This results in a welfare loss from excess optometric examination length and procedures, causing a welfare loss to society of about $8 million annually. In addition, the higher prices due to regulation cause a transfer of wealth from consumers to optometrists of about $140 million annually.