All-Volunteer Force: Is the Experiment Over.

摘要

One oft-repeated claim which has reached the status of conventional wisdom is that the stunning performance of US military forces in the Gulf War vindicated the concept of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). Pundits in Washington along with many military observers saw the victory as much the result of talented and professional military personnel as it was of the high-tech equipment they operated. The results seemed to speak for themselves--years of investment in training, recruiting, compensation packages, and quality of life initiatives had produces what President Clinton later described as 'the best- trained, best equipped, best prepared military force in the world.' The 'hollow force' of the 1970s was a distant memory, one that policymakers and commanders vowed never to repeat. Even before the Gulf War, some had already claimed victory for the AVF. In 1983, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger declared the AVF a success and assured the America never need return to a draft, announcing 'the experiment is over' and the term 'All-Volunteer Force' could now 'go without saying.' But is the experiment truly over, or is the jury still out. Will tomorrow's force require an even higher quality recruit than the AVF can provide. Will increased OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO coupled with growing perceptions of eroded benefits drive out experienced NCO's and officers. What demographic and social factors may hinder the military's ability to recruit high quality personnel. Are we beginning to see warning signs in slipping retention and recruiting indicators. This paper will attempt to address these issues and assess the continued viability of what some have described as the 'greatest social experiment ever conducted in America.' The essay will conclude with the author's policy recommendations for ensuring a future quality force.