New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency

摘要

From the 196Os to the 198Os stopping Communist-backed insurgents was an important part of American strategy, so counterinsurgency was an important mission for the US military, particularly the Army Even when most of the Army turned its attention to large-scale warfighting and the operational art following Vietnam, special operation forces preserved some degree of capability In the 198Os American involvement in El Salvador and a spate of insurgencies around the world linked to the Soviets and Chinese sparked renewed interest in counterinsurgency operations (as a component of low-intensity conflict) By 1990 what could be called the El Salvador model of counterinsurgency, based on a limited US military footprint in conjunction with the strengthening of local security forces, became codified in strategy and doctrine. Interest then faded Policymakers, military leaders, and defense experts assumed that insurgency was a relic of the Cold War, posing little challenge in the 'new world order'. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the mellowing of China, insurgency even though it persisted in the far corners of the world was not viewed as a strategic challenge to the world's sole superpower With American involvement in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti, international peacekeeping a previously unimportant role for the military moved to the fore In a burst of energy, the military revamped its peacekeeping doctrine and concepts Professional military education and training shifted to accommodate these missions Wargames, conferences, and seminars proliferated Counterinsurgency was forgotten by all but a tiny handful of scholars.