Casualty Aversion in the Post-Cold War Era: Defined and Analyzed Through the Logic of Clausewitz.

摘要

In the Post-Cold War era, the United States has found itself frequently involved in Small-Scale Contingencies. With a limited understanding of the purpose for these SSC s, Americans were unsettled by the casualties incurred. This paper defines casualty aversion as: An unwillingness by the political and military leadership to place the American military in a position of danger, even to the exclusion of accomplishing policy aims. This unwillingness is most pronounced during Small-Scale Contingencies, and can manifest itself by, strategic indecision, irresolute behavior, or indecisive application of military force. Casualty aversion is rooted in the misperceived lessons of Vietnam and has been exacerbated by failures in Beirut (1982), Somalia (1992), and Haiti (1992). Successful SSC's are characterized by strong leadership, from the President, identifying the reasons for military intervention. Clausewitz, in 'On War' reinforces that war is a political instrument. He states that political leaders have the right and requirement to provide limitations in war. These may have adverse strategic effects by limiting the conduct of coercive statecraft. To overcome the negative aspects of casualty aversion, political leaders must provide informed, candid explanations to the American people. Military leaders must also deemphasize body counts and precision munitions effects, while emphasizing the mission and its linkage to national policy.