Effects Based Operations in Iraq - A Case for Army Acceptance

摘要

The application of effects base operations (EBO) concepts have become the norm in Iraq. In command posts from Multi-National Force - Iraq through battalion level, commanders have taken a systems analysis approach to the problems they face. They are striving to attain desired effects that have attached measures of effectiveness and indicators. Joint Doctrine has recently adopted these concepts while current and emerging U.S. Army doctrine continues to reject the applicability of EBO concepts at the operational and tactical levels. This paper reviews the development of effects based concepts and doctrine, outlines the theoretical foundations of U.S. Army doctrine, establishes the unique challenges of counterinsurgency, assesses units' application of effects based operations in Iraq, and provides observations and recommendations with regard to the U.S. Army and effects based operations. The purpose of this paper is to (1) determine if units in Iraq are applying EBO concepts in consonance with joint doctrine and (2) consider the direction of U.S. Army doctrine reference EBO.