Arms Control Verification: 'Bridge' Theories and the Politics of Expediency.

摘要

Seldom do American political leaders discuss modern arms control without reference to the seemingly inseparable issue of compliance verification. Although 'verification' has a variety of potential meanings, it has long been regarded as the central determinant of good or bad security agreements from a Western perspective. Every American president during the postwar era has observed both the importance of nuclear arms control and the impossibility of its realization without adequate provisions for compliance verification. Part I describes the political chasm separating a closed and traditionally deceptive Soviet system from an open American system that is politically and ethically committed to arms control. Part II reviews various scientific, technical, and legal theories according to which monitoring mechanisms, dignified by treaty language, were said to 'bridge' this political chasm. Part III discusses the consequences of these guidelines to policy and evaluate their effectiveness in implementing the various treaties and agreements they have licensed.