Retrospective Analysis of the Carter Koreanization Plan: A Case Study of aBlurred Vision

摘要

The purpose of this study is twofold: to examine the process that producedPresident Jimmy Carter's Koreanization Plan, i.e. his 1977 decision to withdraw all combat ground forces from the Republic of Korea; and, given the evolving world order of the 1990s, to assess the feasibility for success attendant to the Bush Administration's decision to reinstitute the withdrawal. Since the close of the Korean War in July 1953, and as a function of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, a cascading effect of United States foreign policy has been the stationing of ground combat forces on the Korean Peninsula to act as a deterrent to a North Korean invasion and, in combination with other United States forces, to demonstrate American resolve for stability and security for other regional allies. After presenting the facts of how Carter made his decision as well as an examination of current United States strategic interests on the peninsula; the military balance; the likelihood of Sino Soviet intervention if war were to occur; and, the feasibility of the Bush Plan, the study concludes that Carter's Plan for withdrawing troops was a strategic decision influenced more by his personal views regarding human rights and his desire to win the Presidency than by an enlightened awareness of the North Korean military threat in Northeast Asia--thus dooming it to failure.