A game-theoretic model for generation expansion planning: problemformulation and numerical comparisons

摘要

This paper presents an application of noncooperative game theorynto generation expansion planning (GEP) in a competitive electricitynindustry. The authors apply the Cournot model of oligopoly behavior tonformulate a GEP model that may characterize expansion planning in ancompetitive regime, particularly in pool-dominated generation supplynindustries. Numerical experiments are conducted on a test system tonanalyze generation investment and market participation decisions ofncandidate expansion units that vary in costs and forced outage rates.nThe numerical results point to: (1) greater industry expansion andnsystem reliability, under Cournot competition than under centralizednexpansion planning; and (2) higher probabilistic measures of reliabilitynfrom multi-player expansion than from expansion by a traditionalnmonopolist with an equivalent reserve margin requirement. Furthermore,nthe authors summarize analytical results involving a simplified versionnof the GEP game