...
首页> 外文期刊>IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing >Functional Forms of Optimum Spoofing Attacks for Vector Parameter Estimation in Quantized Sensor Networks
【24h】

Functional Forms of Optimum Spoofing Attacks for Vector Parameter Estimation in Quantized Sensor Networks

机译:量化传感器网络中向量参数估计的最佳欺骗攻击的功能形式

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

Estimation of an unknown deterministic vector from quantized sensor data is considered in the presence of spoofing attacks, which alter the data presented to several sensors. Contrary to the previous work, a generalized attack model is employed which manipulates the data using transformations with arbitrary functional forms determined by some attack parameters whose values are unknown to the attacked system. For the first time, necessary and sufficient conditions are provided under which the transformations provide a guaranteed attack performance in terms of Cramer–Rao Bound (CRB) regardless of the processing the estimation system employs, thus defining a highly desirable attack. Interestingly, these conditions imply that, for any such attack when the attacked sensors can be perfectly identified by the estimation system, either the Fisher information matrix (FIM) for jointly estimating the desired and attack parameters is singular or that the attacked system is unable to improve the CRB for the desired vector parameter through this joint estimation even though the joint FIM is nonsingular. It is shown that it is always possible to construct such a highly desirable attack by properly employing a sufficiently large dimension attack vector parameter relative to the number of quantization levels employed, which was not observed previously. To illustrate the theory in a concrete way, we also provide some numerical results which corroborate that under the highly desirable attack, attacked data are not useful in reducing the CRB.
机译:在存在欺骗攻击的情况下,可以考虑从量化的传感器数据估计未知的确定性向量,从而改变呈现给多个传感器的数据。与先前的工作相反,采用了通用的攻击模型,该模型使用具有任意功能形式的转换来操纵数据,这些功能形式由某些攻击参数决定,而这些攻击参数的值对于被攻击系统而言是未知的。首次提供了必要和充分的条件,在这些条件下,无论克莱特-饶边界(CRB)为何,转换都可提供有保证的攻击性能,而与估计系统采用的处理方式无关,从而定义了非常理想的攻击方式。有趣的是,这些条件意味着,对于任何这样的攻击,当估计系统可以完美地识别出被攻击的传感器时,用于共同估计所需参数和攻击参数的Fisher信息矩阵(FIM)就是奇异的,或者被攻击的系统无法即使联合FIM是非奇异的,也可以通过此联合估计为所需的矢量参数改善CRB。可以看出,总是有可能通过适当地采用相对于所采用的量化水平的数量足够大的尺寸的攻击矢量参数来构造这种高度期望的攻击,这是以前没有观察到的。为了以具体方式说明该理论,我们还提供了一些数值结果,证实了在高度期望的攻击下,被攻击的数据对于减少CRB无效。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号