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Side-Channel Analysis and Countermeasure Design on ARM-Based Quantum-Resistant SIKE

机译:扶手量子耐仓侧通道分析与对策设计

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The implementations of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms have been newly explored, whereas, the protection against side-channel attacks shall be considered upfront, since it can have a non-negligible impact on security and performance. In this article, the security of supersingular isogeny key encapsulation (SIKE), a second-round candidate of NIST's on-going post-quantum standardization process, is thoroughly evaluated under side-channel analysis. First, the vulnerabilities of reference and optimized implementations of SIKE are thoroughly analyzed in terms of both horizontal and vertical side-channel leakage. After the optimized SIKE, which is based on Three-point Montgomery Differential Ladder algorithm, is proved to be constant-time and there is no horizontal leakage, a vertical vulnerability is analyzed based on the source code at the algorithmic level, and a theoretical differential power analysis (DPA) attack is proposed. In order to exploit this vulnerability, the differential electromagnetic attack (DEMA) is put into practice to extract the private key of SIKE based on a 32-bit ARM platform. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first practical side-channel attack at SIKE implemented on real ARM-based devices. Our experiments show that the DEMA needs only hundreds of electromagnetic traces to carry out the attack. More importantly, an efficient window-based countermeasure is proposed to eliminate the vertical leakage and prevent side-channel attacks with only a little overhead. The security of our countermeasure is carefully evaluated against most of well-known power analysis attacks. Through careful evaluation and comparison with other countermeasures, this method can lead to higher security at a very small cost in terms of time and memory.
机译:新探索量子加密算法的实现,而对侧渠攻击的保护应被视为预先考虑,因为它可能对安全性和性能产生不可忽略的影响。在本文中,在侧通道分析下,在侧通道分析下彻底评估了覆盖了正面封装(Sike)的超出次数键封装(Sike)的第二轮候选者的安全性。首先,就水平和垂直侧通道泄漏而彻底分析了Sike的参考和优化实施的脆弱性。经过证明基于三点蒙哥拉姆差分梯形图算法的优化Sike之后,没有水平泄漏,基于算法水平的源代码分析垂直漏洞,以及理论差异提出了功率分析(DPA)攻击。为了利用这种漏洞,差动电磁攻击(DEMA)实践以基于32位臂平台提取SIKE的私钥。据我们所知,这是在基于ARM的设备上实现的Sike的第一个实用的侧面频道攻击。我们的实验表明,DEMA仅需要数百个电磁迹线来进行攻击。更重要的是,提出了一种基于窗口的对策,以消除垂直泄漏,并防止仅具有一点开销的侧通道攻击。针对大多数知名功率分析攻击仔细评估了我们对策的安全性。通过仔细评估和与其他对策进行比较,这种方法可以在时间和记忆中以非常小的成本导致更高的安全性。

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