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回收再制造与定价决策模型及供应链协调分析

             

摘要

假定负责废旧产品回收再制造的生产商为主导者.针对单生产商和单零售商组成的逆向供应链,分析了Stackelberg博弈(分散式控制)下和合作(集中式控制)下的零售价和回收再制造率决策,发现集中式供应链的利润较高,给出了协调供应链的利润共享合同.针对单生产商和n个竞争零售商组成的供应链,分析了一主多从Stackelberg博弈和联合决策,结果表明供应链合作可降低产品的零售价格、提高回收再制造率和供应链总利润,进而给出了协调单生产商和n个零售商决策的利润共享合同.最后的算例表明了模型的合理性和协调合同的有效性.%Assume that the manufacturer as a leader is in charge of product remanufacturing.This paper analyzes the pricing and product remanufacturing rate decisions in a reverse supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer under decentralized control model and centralized control model, respectively, i.e., two agents play Stackelberg game or make codetermination.The profit of centralized supply chain is higher, so a profitsharing contract is put forward to coordinate the supply chain.Then, Stackelberg game with one leader and multi - followers and joint decisions are analyzed respectively in a reverse supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and n competing retailers.It shows that supply chain cooperation can reduce retail price, increase product remanufacturing rate and total profit of the supply chain.So, a profit - sharing contract is put forward to coordinate the decisions of the manufacturer and n retailers.The results of final numerical example show the reasonability of these models and the validity of the coordination contracts.

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