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研发投资、企业风险与高管薪酬--业绩敏感性

         

摘要

企业研发投资会影响高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性。本文以2010~2014年沪深A股上市公司数据为样本,实证检验了研发投资、企业风险与高管薪酬———业绩敏感性之间的关系。研究结论表明,研发投资与企业风险呈正相关关系;增加研发投资导致企业风险加大,高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性会有所降低;进一步地,企业风险在研发投资与高管薪酬———业绩敏感性的负向关系中起中介作用。本文不仅丰富了高管薪酬———业绩敏感性影响因素的研究,也为企业针对研发活动设计合理薪酬契约提供了决策支持。%The sensitivity between executive pay and performance will be influenced by corporate R&D investment . This paper se-lects 2010-2014 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as sample data , empirically test the relationship among R&D invest-ment , corporate risk and executive pay-performance sensitivity . Our findings show that , R&D investment and corporate risk are in posi-tive relationship;increasing R&D investment leads to bigger corporate risk and the sensitivity between executive pay and performance will be reduced;furthermore , corporate risk play an intermediary role in the negative relationship between R&D investment and executive pay-performance sensitivity . This paper not only enriches the research of executive pay-performance sensitivity , but also has guided signifi-cance for designing reasonable executive compensation contract scheme for R&D investment .

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