指称问题在语言哲学中具有基础性和根本性地位，它所关注的基本问题是语词如何与对象相关。同语“N1 is N2”的 N2具有双重指称，它既可以指称其本身而获得字面意义，也可以指称以其自身作为原型成员的临时范畴，这就需要语言哲学的指称理论对其进行合理的解释，但以客观主义哲学为基础的描述指称论和历史因果指称论在解释双重指称现象方面力不从心。塞尔的意向性理论则是从客观主义哲学到体验哲学的过渡，在体验哲学的框架内，结合认知主体的体验和认知因素，可找到诠释同语双重指称的实现及其意指关系调整的复杂性和动态性的有效路径。研究表明，人类凭借自己的身体与世界互动，形成了各种原型范畴知识网络，原型和临时范畴的构建就是双重指称现象存在的经验基础。同时，人类具有随身而来，且经后天强化的转喻能力，这可以视为双重指称的实现和第二级意义调整的具身基础。%The issue of the reference,which is concerned with how words relate to objects,occupies a fundamental position in the philosophy of language.In the constructions “N1 is N2”,N2 involves dual dereference,i.e.it can refer literally to itself on the one hand,and refers to an ad hoc category in which it is the prototype member of that category.This intriguing phenomenon requires an explanation from ref-erence theories.Description theory and historic-causal theory are inadequate in explaining the dual refer-ence phenomenon.With Searle’s intentional reference theory as a bridge,this paper then seeks a dy-namic and constructive explanation within the embodiment-based theories,attaching more importance to the subjects’bodily experience and cognitive factors.It is argued that the resolution of dual reference re-quires both embodied experience and metonymic ability:the former explains how people form prototype-based knowledge networks and construct ad hoc categories;the latter,a body-based ability,can explain the dynamic nature of how dual reference are realized.
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