THE PROBLEM OF THE IDENTITY OF SELF-RELATION AND SELF-NEGATION IN HEGEL'S 'WISSENSCHAFT DER LOGIK'.

摘要

Part One establishes that self-relation, or truth, is the leading feature of thought and that logic is the science of self-relation. Any science concerns the truth of its subject matter, but logic must analyze truth itself. For that reason, logic is the "architectonic science," and its outcome is the "immanent deduction of the Concept." Thus, logic represents not only the science of self-relation, but the self-relation of science.;In Part Three, we show that negation, too, has its "truth," or self-relation. The truth of negation is self-negation. This is illustrated by analyzing the concepts Becoming and Determinate Being. A discussion of logical method reveals that, in self-negation, negation as an independent element disappears from logic to emerge as a moment in the self-relation of the Concept. We show that, for Hegel, "dialectic is a function of totality." In this way, the self-resolving identity of self-relation and self-negation also dominates the structure of the science that is the science of this structure.;Part Four is an exposition of the first part of the Doctrine of Essence. In Essence, the identity of self-relation and self-negation undergoes a "self-sublation": It is rendered a result of itself. The autonomy of the Concept is thereby established, and the identity of self-relation and self-negation is revealed as the basic idea of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik.;In Part Two, by way of a contrast with Kant, we show that Hegel conceives logic not as a science of pure form, but of the identity of form and content. For this reason, concepts may be established as true or false in themselves, apart from any application to sensuous experience. It is only because concepts possess an immanent source of content, and therefore an immanent criterion of truth, that logic may become a science. This immanent criterion is the self-relation, or self-application, of each logical concept. We analyze the concepts Being and Nothing as examples of this method, which reveals not merely their self-relation, but the identity within them of a self-relation and a self-negation. This identity is the chief problem of logic as well as the strategy for its solution.