This dissertation examines the legislative lobbying efforts of two types of interest groups. The main thesis of this study is that the changes that occurred in the congressional election context in conjunction with the decentralization of decision-making in the House of Representatives have fundamentally altered the legislative role of interest groups as information providers.;This study looks at the changes in legislative lobbying of two sets of interest groups--environmental groups and labor unions. The analysis involves an examination of group activity through House committee hearing testimony as well as through the perceptions of lobbyists representing these groups, as presented in face-to-face interviews with the author. In addition, some interviews with congressional staff were employed for parts of the study.;The findings of this study are that the groups analyzed responded to the changes in congressional decision-making by interacting with a more varied group of legislators. However, since the fragmentation process forced some groups to interact with committees with different preference patterns, decentralization reforms had differing effects on environmental groups and labor unions.;In addition, as the informational needs of legislators have changed in response to the institutional changes, the provision of information by interest groups is a key method of legislative lobbying. Interview data and other evidence indicate that some groups are more likely to engage in the provision of information regarding political consequences, while others provide more of the technical information that links policy means to policy ends. Depending on the type of interest group and the preference pattern of relevant committees, this informational specialization has been either advantageous or an obstacle. The effect of fragmenting reforms in the U.S. House of Representatives was to advantage environmental groups with a political focus and labor unions with a technical focus.
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