An important, but relatively neglected, aspect of machine models of consciousness is the requirement for a scientific phenomenology, or systematic means of characterizing the experiential states being modelled. In those few cases where need of such a phenomenology is acknowledged, the default approach is usually to use language-based specifications, such as "the visual experience of a red bicycle leaning against a white wall". Such specifications are problematic for several reasons: 1) they are not fine-grained enough to capture the full detail of the experience being modelled; 2) they are overly conceptual, in that they can specify the experience only of subjects that possess the concepts used in the specification (e.g., bicycle or leaning); 3) they are "cold" in that there is no essential connection between the experience so specified and affect, while many experiences are "hot", having constitutive implications for action; 4) they are disembodied, in that no explicit reference is made in the specification to the kinds of abilities necessary for being in a experiential state with that content. What is needed, then, is an alternative means of specifying the content of experience that overcomes some or all of these limitations.
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