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The Low Leverage Decisions of Knowledge based Firms - An empirical study of the impact of employees' risk preferences on the firm's capital structure decisions

机译:知识型企业的低杠杆决策 - 对员工风险偏好对企业资本结构决策影响的实证研究

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摘要

A distinctive trait of knowledge-based companies is their dependency on the competence andcontribution of their employees. They are commonly structured as partnership firms and tend tohave a low amount of tangible assets and virtually no debt. Although theories within capitalstructure state that debt can indeed be beneficial, knowledge-based companies persistentlychoose to completely avoid the use of long-term debt and hence do not adequately fit thedescription of any of the dominant theories within the field.The aim of this thesis is to analyse and explain the process behind the capital structure decisionsof knowledge-based firms. The main purpose is to see how well these companies align to themajor theories within the field and seek further explanations in alternative theories where theformer do not suffice. Moreover, due to the nature of the firm’s assets an interesting aspect toinvestigate further is whether the risk preferences of the firm’s employees affect the firmsfinancing decisions. The emphasis is put on partners’ ability to impact decisions as they havedecision-making authority and incentives to maximise profitability, gaining rewards in the form ofsubstantial yearly dividend payments.The study was performed with the use of a qualitative method, which enables a profoundunderstanding of what affects decisions. Primary data was collected through interviews withrepresentatives of four knowledge-based firms operating in the fields of law, consulting andadvertising, which were deemed to provide a broad and fair view of the industry. We sought tointerview employees that had great insight in the companies’ finances; therefore the interviewswere conducted with either the Chief Financial Officer or Chief Executive Officer of therespective firms in order to gain as high reliability as possible.The study showed that the main reason for avoidance of debt was most often referred to theinterviewed companies’ low investment needs. Moreover, theories in the area were found not tobe actively considered, even though evidence in favour of them can be found. Much of thefindings aligned with the implications of the pecking order theory, but even so the extremepolicies of knowledge-based need more explaining. In line with the stakeholder co-investmenttheory the thesis investigates whether the risk preferences of the firms’ employees, in being themost important stakeholder, in any way affect decision-making. It was found that even thoughnot explicitly expressed, many times decisions are made that favour the employees over theoverall financial benefit of the firm. Rather than increasing the market value of the company bytaking on debt, dividend-payouts create value-enhancing activities on a personal level.
机译:知识型公司的一个显着特征是它们依赖于员工的能力和贡献。它们通常是由合伙公司组成,往往有形资产数量很少,几乎没有债务。尽管资本结构中的理论指出债务确实可以带来好处,但是知识型公司坚持选择完全避免长期债务的使用,因此不适合该领域任何主流理论的描述。分析和解释知识型企业的资本结构决策背后的过程。主要目的是了解这些公司如何与该领域的主要理论保持一致,并在前者不足的另类理论中寻求进一步的解释。此外,由于公司资产的性质,一个值得进一步研究的有趣方面是公司员工的风险偏好是否会影响公司的融资决策。重点在于合作伙伴具有决策权和激励力以最大化利润,以每年大量的股息支付形式获得奖励的能力来影响决策。该研究是使用定性方法进行的,这可以使人们深刻理解什么影响决策。通过采访四家在法律,咨询和广告领域运营的知识型公司的代表,收集了原始数据,这些数据被认为可以提供对该行业的广泛而公正的看法。我们试图采访对公司财务有深刻见解的员工;因此,与各个公司的首席财务官或首席执行官进行了访谈,以期获得尽可能高的可靠性。研究表明,避免债务的主要原因通常是受访公司的低投资需求。此外,发现该地区的理论并未得到积极考虑,即使可以找到支持它们的证据。许多发现与啄序理论的含义相吻合,但是即使如此,基于知识的极端政策也需要更多的解释。与利益相关者共同投资理论相一致,本文研究了作为最重要的利益相关者的公司员工的风险偏好是否会以任何方式影响决策。人们发现,尽管没有明确表述,但很多时候还是做出了使雇员胜于公司整体财务利益的决定。股息支付并没有通过承担债务来增加公司的市场价值,而是在个人层面上创造了增值活动。

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