An analysis of Husserlian phenomenology : its resistance towards psychologism, its understanding of the natural attitude and its relationship with cognitive behavioural psychotherapies

摘要

Husserlian phenomenology has often been cited as having influenced research methodologies within nursing research and psychology. However, at the same time, Husserl is explicitly opposed to what he termed as psychologism. The following thesis argues that Husserl’s opposition to the psychology of his day was based specifically upon his opposition of naturalism’s treatment of consciousness. Moreover, the thesis argues that there is a tendency within the Social Sciences to misread Husserlian Phenomenology as a type of introspectionists’ account of subjective states. The thesis critiques the claim that cognitive therapy is Husserlian phenomenology, but concludes that there are aspects of cognitive psychotherapy which do appear to be using parts of a methodology that Husserl would have recognised as a legitimate phenomenology. Indeed, the thesis argues that by gaining a further understanding of Husserl’s ‘discovery’ of attitude and interest and the fundamental structures of intentionality, cognitive therapists could enhance and further their understanding of what takes place within the change process during cognitive psychotherapy; and conversely, cognitive therapy’s description of the maintenance of emotional disorders can contribute to Husserl’s own account of the natural attitude. That is, that the natural attitude consists of a universalising attitude which is fundamental to the natural attitude per se. The thesis develops this argument further, by examining the theoretical underpinnings within cognitive therapy and extrapolating what appears as the incidental, yet significant, phenomenological structures within cognitive therapy’s clinical interventions. The thesis uses the identified phenomenological structures within cognitive therapy’s treatment of emotional disorder to firstly, further develop the phenomenological description of the universalising attitude as a subset to the natural attitude which, it is argued disguises or presents itself as the ‘genuine natural attitude’. Secondly, the concept of the universalising attitude is developed further to suggest a hierarchy of attitudes within the natural attitude.