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Joint Implementation as Development Policy - The Case of Costa Rica

机译:作为发展政策的联合执行 - 哥斯达黎加的案例

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摘要

Joint Implementation (JI) is a potentially powerful instrument of climate policy that could lead to a high amount of additional financial flows to developing countries. Nevertheless, many NGOs and developing country representatives are very skeptical about JI and fear that it would not take into account development priorities and create new kinds of dependence on industrial countries. Therefore, developing countries and industrial countries found a compromise at the Berlin Conference of the Parties as they instituted a pilot phase for JI lasting until 2000 which does not allow crediting of reduction achieved via JI. The paper discusses first results of the JI pilot phase in Costa Rica which could be important for the evaluation of the whole pilot phase. This country has a relatively high level of economic and social development and a well-developed environmental policy which is comparable to that of advanced industrial countries. It is a major destination for ecotourism. Nevertheless, it suffers from high deforestation due to unequal distribution of land, migration and cattle ranching as well as plantation expansion. Moreover, transport emissions are rising rapidly and fossil fuel electricity generation is growing despite a target of phasing out fossil fuels completely. Costa Rica's knowledge base is high and capacity building almost not necessary. Thus, Costa Rica was able to develop creative environment policy instruments such as debtfornature swaps and biodiversity prospecting to attract foreign funding. It is not surprising that it was the first developing country to open a JI office, develop project approval criteria and host JI pilot projects. The framework for JI in Costa Rica can therefore be described as ideal compared to the average developing country. Nor is it surprising that more than half of the approved pilot projects in developing countries are situated in Costa Rica. Nevertheless, the success can at best described as mixed. Only a third of the projects are actually funded though several of them seem to be profitable even without a value for carbon. Most of them are proposed by US entities. To attract more funding, the JI office now certifies tradable carbon certificates and en-courages multi-sector large-scale projects where transaction costs are lower and coherence with national development objectives can be more easily checked. It directs its attention to public JI investors such as the Norwegian government. The renewable energy projects suffer from the unrealistic target to phase out fossil fuels by 2001 thus making JI projects in this sector impossible from that time. Therefore the bulk of projects concern forestry which is prone to uncertainties in calculation of emission sequestration. A comparison of the estimates shows wildly differing assumptions in baselines and sequestration capacity of the forests. Whether actual project implementation conforms to the plans remains to be seen. An independent verification of project results is being undertaken. The analysis of the Costa Rica case shows that JI can be only successful in the long run if the industrial countries offer incentives for investors and if baseline determination rests on a clear set of guidelines. Human and technical capacities are necessary but not sufficient conditions for successful JI in developing countries. They seem to be able to prevent complete project failures, though and can lead to innovative approaches. The issue will only be settled if large-scale JI investment is forthcoming under a regime of legally binding emission targets for industrial countries. Then the ability to process huge number of project proposals and check whether they conform to development priorities as well as monitoring and verification becomes crucial.
机译:联合执行(JI)是一种潜在有力的气候政策工具,可能导致大量额外资金流向发展中国家。然而,许多非政府组织和发展中国家的代表对联合执行持怀疑态度,并担心它不会考虑发展优先事项并给工业国家带来新的依赖。因此,发展中国家和工业国家在柏林缔约方会议上找到了折衷方案,因为它们为联合执行设立了一个试验阶段,该试验阶段一直持续到2000年,这不能归功于通过联合执行取得的减少。本文讨论了哥斯达黎加JI试点阶段的初步结果,这可能对整个试点阶段的评估很重要。这个国家的经济和社会发展水平较高,并且制定了与发达工业国家相当的环境政策。这是生态旅游的主要目的地。然而,由于土地分配不均,移民和牲畜放牧以及人工林扩张,它遭受了严重的森林砍伐。此外,尽管目标是完全淘汰化石燃料,但运输排放量迅速增加,化石燃料发电量也在增长。哥斯达黎加的知识库很高,几乎不需要进行能力建设。因此,哥斯达黎加能够开发创新的环境政策工具,例如债务互换协议和生物多样性勘探以吸引外国资金。毫不奇怪,它是第一个开设联合执行办公室,制定项目批准标准并主持联合执行试点项目的发展中国家。因此,与一般发展中国家相比,哥斯达黎加的联合执行框架可以说是理想的。发展中国家一半以上的核准试点项目位于哥斯达黎加也不足为奇。然而,成功充其量可以说是喜忧参半。实际上,只有三分之一的项目获得了资助,尽管其中一些项目即使没有碳排放价值也似乎是有利可图的。其中大多数是由美国实体提出的。为了吸引更多资金,JI机构现在对可交易的碳证书进行认证,并鼓励交易成本较低且可以更轻松地检查与国家发展目标的一致性的多部门大型项目。它将注意力转向挪威等公共JI投资者。可再生能源项目遭受的现实目标是要在2001年之前逐步淘汰化石燃料,因此从那时起该领域的联合执行项目就不可能了。因此,大部分项目都与林业有关,在排放量固定计算中容易产生不确定性。对估计值的比较表明,森林的基准线和封存能力的假设大相径庭。实际的项目实施是否符合计划仍有待观察。正在对项目结果进行独立验证。对哥斯达黎加一案的分析表明,只有工业化国家为投资者提供激励措施,并且基线确定以一套明确的准则为基础,联合执行才能长期成功。人员和技术能力是发展中国家成功完成联合执行的必要条件,但不是充分条件。但是,它们似乎可以防止整个项目失败,并且可以带来创新的方法。只有在对工业化国家具有法律约束力的排放目标的制度下,即将进行大规模联合执行投资时,才能解决该问题。然后,处理大量项目建议并检查它们是否符合开发优先级以及进行监视和验证的能力就变得至关重要。

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