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Game of Zones: The Political Economy of Conservation Areas

机译:区域游戏:保护区的政治经济学

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摘要

Provided there are positive external benefits attached to the historic character of buildings, owners of properties in designated conservation areas benefit from a reduction in uncertainty regarding the future of their area. At the same time, the restrictions put in place to ensure the preservation of the historic character limit the degree to which properties can be altered and thus impose a cost to their owners. We test a simple theory of the designation process in which we postulate that the level of designation is chosen to comply with interests of local homeowners. The implication of the model is that a) an increase in preferences for historic character should increase the likelihood of a designation, and b) new designations at the margin should not be associated with significant house price capitalization effects. Our empirical results are in line with these predictions.
机译:只要建筑物的历史特征具有积极的外部利益,指定保护区的财产所有人就可以减少有关其区域未来的不确定性。同时,为确保保留历史人物而采取的限制措施限制了财产可以改变的程度,从而给财产所有人带来了成本。我们测试了有关指定过程的简单理论,在该理论中,我们假设选择的等级符合当地房主的利益。该模型的含义是:a)对历史人物的喜好增加会增加指定的可能性,并且b)边缘的新指定不应与显着的房价资本化效应相关联。我们的经验结果与这些预测相符。

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