A significant volume of traffic uses a rail-truck intermodal transportation network, making it the preferred transportation medium for customers. Thus, the associated infrastructure of rail-truck intermodal transportation should be considered critical, i.e., systems and assets whose destruction (or disruption) would have a crippling effect on security, economy, public health, and safety. Disruptions could be induced by nature such as hurricane Katrina in 2005, or man-made disturbances such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. This thesis proposes an analytical approach to preserve, as much as possible, the functionality of a rail-truck intermodal transportation system in the wake of worst-case attacks. As such, it will serves as an aid to the top managers to compare the cost of implementing protective measures with the benefits that such measures could bring. A tri-level Defender-Attacker-Defender (DAD) approach is proposed to model this situation, where the outermost problem belongs to the network operator with a limited budget to protect some of the terminals, the middle level problem belongs to the attacker with enough resources to interdict some of the un-protected terminals, and the innermost problem belongs to the intermodal operator who attempts to meet the demand on a reduced network with the minimum cost. Since the resulting model is very difficult to solve by any optimization package, efficient solution techniques have been developed for solving this model. Finally, the proposed framework is applied to the rail-truck intermodal transportation network of a Class I railroad operator in North America to discover the optimal way to protect the system.
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