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Essays on Political Actors and Attitudes: Do They Constitute Distributed Reflexivity?Part 2: A Dynamical Typology of Rationality

机译:关于政治行为者和态度的论文:它们是否构成了分布式反身性?第2部分:理性的动态类型学

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摘要

What is the relationship between the logic that guides political attitudes of constituencies and the logic of political actors, whose legitimacy is rooted in electoral choice of the constituencies? Classical approaches, such as the median voter theorem, view political actors as passively mirroring voters’ preferences. An alternative approach, that we suggested in the first part of this series of essays, assumes that how constituencies see the competences of political actors, is crucial, in the sense that it does not only reflect voters’ preferences, but it is also manipulable by the agency of political actors themselves. In this article we provide additional arguments in support of the thesis that the perception of competences is socially constructed and contextually dependent. We hypothesise that in times of well-being the logic of appropriateness prevails among both the constituencies and their political representatives, while in times of crisis constituencies resort to the logic of arguing, and leaders predominantly use the logic of consequences with some admixtures of the logic of arguing. Our arguments draw on Raymond Boudon’s neo-Weberian “judicatory” or “cognitivist” model of rationality; on the theory of securitisation developed by Barry Buzan and his collaborators, under the influence of “speech act” theory of John Austin; and on the typology of basic logics of action, first proposed by James March and Johan Olsen, and later refined by Thomas Risse, under the influence of Jürgen Habermas.
机译:指导选区政治态度的逻辑与政治行为者的逻辑之间的关系是什么,其合法性根植于选区的选举选择?中位数选民定理等经典方法将政治角色视为被动反映选民的偏好。我们在本系列文章的第一部分中建议的另一种方法是假定选民如何看待政治行为者的能力至关重要,因为它不仅反映了选民的偏好,而且可以通过以下方式加以操纵:政治行为者本身的代理。在本文中,我们提供了其他论据来支持以下观点:对能力的感知是社会建构的,并且是与上下文相关的。我们假设在选民和其政治代表中,适度的逻辑在选民的逻辑中普遍存在,而在危机时,选民则诉诸于论证的逻辑,而领导者则主要使用后果逻辑与逻辑的某些混合体的争论。我们的论点借鉴了雷蒙德·布登(Raymond Boudon)的新韦伯主义的“司法”或“认知主义”理性模型。在约翰·奥斯丁(John Austin)的“言语行为”理论的影响下,研究了巴里·布赞(Barry Buzan)及其合作者提出的证券化理论;关于行动的基本逻辑的类型学,首先由詹姆士·马奇(James March)和约翰·奥尔森(Johan Olsen)提出,后来在汤根·哈贝马斯(JürgenHabermas)的影响下由托马斯·里斯(Thomas Risse)完善。

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