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Unemployment benefits, activation and the interaction between levels of government. Experiences with moral hazard in multi-tiered labour market governance systems

机译:失业救济金,激励机制和各级政府之间的互动。多层劳动力市场治理体系中的道德风险经验

摘要

There are some who consider supranational unemployment-based automatic stabilizers to be advantageous for the Euro area and the European Union at large (Deinzer 2004; Dullien 2007, 2012, 2014; French Ministry of Finance and Public Accounts 2014; see Figure 1). An E(MU)-wide unemployment benefit scheme could function as an automatic stabilizer but it could also create awareness amongst European citizens for the efforts and the advantages of the Union and it could reinforce convergence of social models. This paper focusses on stabilisation purposes and investigates issues of moral hazard. Even though the political climate in Europe is very hostile to further integration – in some countries more so than others – it would be wise to consider the merits of such proposals as it is the duty for public officials, politicians and researchers to look beyond the problems of today and to contemplate the solutions of tomorrow. If an E(M)U-wide unemployment benefit scheme, or some scheme that reinforces and supports national systems, could actually achieve at least some of the goals stated above, it warrants further investigation. In order to fully appreciate the possibilities and the limitations of a supranational scheme in combination with national schemes, it is paramount to learn from the experiences with actual real world practices of multi-tiered unemployment systems. Nearly everywhere in the European Union, but also in other Western countries, unemployment schemes are already multi-tiered in some form or another. Moreover, there is a strong European tendency to decentralise unemployment administration, social assistance and activation of the unemployed (Van Berkel & Borghi 2008, Wieshaupt 2010, Mosley 2011). It is crucial that, before we even think about adding another layer on top of existing unemployment schemes, we understand the realities and experiences of the (interaction between) existing layers.This paper will focus on the decentralisation efforts and the experiences with multi-tiered systems of unemployment benefits, social assistance and activation that exist today in order to explore the issue of moral hazard. The current European trend of decentralisation is very much linked to activation and moral hazard. The issue of moral hazard is especially relevant for the solidarity among contributors of any unemployment related scheme. This is one of the reasons for enacting activation systems. Passive labour market policies, administrating and disbursing cash benefits, are policies that are often executed at the central level. But the transition from passive to activating unemployment systems requires governments to have more intimate knowledge of unemployed individuals (Van Berkel & Borghi 2008). Activation, in this line of reasoning, requires tailor-made policies and the capacity to administer and monitor those policies. This logic mandates a decentralisation of labour market policies to local governments (OECD 2003: 12-17, Knuth & Larsen 2010). But besides the effort to bring activation closer to the unemployed, there are also other reasons for a multi-tiered system. Because there is a variety of motivations behind multi-tiered systems it does not come as a surprise that there are different forms of decentralisation. Bredgaard and Larsen try to bring order in the multitude of questions considering multi-tiered schemes and reforms. They identify two main dimensions: formal policy and operational policy (Table 1). Formal policy reforms concern the actual content of policies, whereas operational policy reforms deal with the relationship and the responsibilities of actors: who implements policy, who is responsible and to whom? Such questions are exactly the type of questions that are relevant for understanding the possibilities and limitations of multi-tiered systems. Therefore, the main focus of this paper will be on operational policy reforms. In practice, the difference between those two dimensions might not be so clear-cut. This paper will investigate different forms of multi-tiered labour market governance systems to draw lessons for possible E(M)U-wide employment based automatic stabilizers – and especially it will review experiences with issues of moral hazard. Different forms of multi-tiered governance relate to possible European schemes in different ways. First of all, the federal form of labour market governance decentralisation of the United States forms the inspiration for the works by Dullien. Arguably, the way in which the American states and the federal level relate to each other is more akin to the relationship between the member states and the supra-national level of the EU than how municipalities and centralized governments relate to each other. The relation between the American states and the federal government (the leeway they enjoy in labour market governance) but also the size and demographic characteristics resemble the EU member states more closely than the characteristics of municipalities do. In order to assess whether we can draw any lessons from the U.S. experience we need to understand the institutional dimension of the U.S. experience. Secondly, the way in which municipalised or regionalised EU member states deal with issues of moral hazard might provide valuable insights for any policymaker contemplating supranational schemes. The European experiences are, thus, very relevant as well. Thirdly, any European scheme needs to take account of the variety of labour market governance in the European Union itself. In other words, the design of an E(M)U-wide scheme should accommodate or at least recognise the variety of its member states. This paper itself does not represent the full diversity of EU member states, it only deals with a subset of the possible range of constellations.This paper will proceed in the following manner. Firstly, a theoretical framework will be constructed in order to understand the basic concepts inherent to multi-tiered labour market governance systems. Secondly, this theoretical framework will be used to select cases which represent the different forms of multi-tiered governance models. Thirdly, the institutional framework of the cases will be analysed. The insights gained from the cases will be combined with the theoretical framework in the ‘results’ chapter. Finally, the conclusions and pointers for further investigation will be outlined in the last chapter.
机译:有些人认为超国家基于失业的自动稳定器对欧元区和整个欧盟有利(Deinzer 2004; Dullien 2007,2012,2014;法国财政和公共账户部2014;见图1)。整个E(MU)范围的失业救济金计划都可以起到自动稳定器的作用,但它也可以使欧洲公民意识到联盟的努力和优势,并可以加强社会模式的融合。本文侧重于稳定目的,并研究道德风险问题。尽管欧洲的政治气氛非常不利于进一步的整合(在某些国家中比其他国家更严重),但考虑这些建议的优点还是明智的,因为公职人员,政治人物和研究人员有责任超越问题。今天,并考虑明天的解决方案。如果整个E(M)U范围内的失业救济金计划或某种加强和支持国家系统的计划实际上能够至少实现上述某些目标,则值得进一步调查。为了充分理解超国家计划与国家计划相结合的可能性和局限性,最重要的是从多层次失业系统的实际实践中学习经验。在欧盟的几乎所有地方,以及在其他西方国家,失业计划已经以某种形式出现了多层。此外,欧洲有一种强烈的趋势,即将失业管理,社会救助和失业者的权力下放(Van Berkel&Borghi 2008,Wieshaupt 2010,Mosley 2011)。至关重要的是,在我们甚至不考虑在现有失业计划的基础上再增加一层之前,我们了解现有层之间(相互作用)的现实和经验。本文将着重于权力下放工作和多层次的经验。为了探讨道德风险问题,当今存在着失业救济,社会救助和激活制度。当前欧洲的权力下放趋势与激活和道德风险息息相关。道德风险问题与任何与失业有关的计划的捐助者之间的团结尤为重要。这是制定激活系统的原因之一。被动的劳动力市场政策,管理和支付现金利益,是经常在中央一级执行的政策。但是,从被动失业制度向激活失业制度的转变要求政府对失业人员有更深入的了解(Van Berkel&Borghi 2008)。按照这种推理,激活需要量身定制的策略以及管理和监视这些策略的能力。这种逻辑要求将劳动力市场政策下放给地方政府(OECD 2003:12-17,Knuth&Larsen 2010)。但是,除了努力使失业者更接近激活之外,还有其他原因需要多层系统。由于多层系统背后的动机多种多样,因此存在不同形式的分散化也就不足为奇了。考虑到多层计划和改革,布雷德加德和拉森试图在众多问题中取得先机。它们确定了两个主要方面:正式政策和运营政策(表1)。正式的政策改革涉及政策的实际内容,而运营政策改革则涉及行为者的关系和责任:谁来实施政策,谁负责和对谁负责?这些问题正是与理解多层系统的可能性和局限性相关的问题的类型。因此,本文的主要重点将放在运营政策改革上。实际上,这两个维度之间的差异可能不是那么清晰。本文将研究不同形式的多层劳动力市场治理体系,以为可能的基于E(M)U的基于就业的自动稳定器吸取教训-尤其是它将回顾有关道德风险问题的经验。不同形式的多层治理以不同的方式与可能的欧洲计划相关。首先,美国劳动力市场治理权力下放的联邦形式为杜利恩的著作提供了灵感。可以说,美国各州和联邦政府之间的联系方式更类似于成员国与欧盟超国家水平之间的关系,而不是市政当局和中央政府之间的联系方式。美国各州与联邦政府之间的关系(他们在劳动力市场治理中享有的余地),但其规模和人口特征却比市政当局的特征更像欧盟成员国。为了评估我们是否可以从美国经验中吸取任何教训,我们需要了解美国经验的制度层面。第二,欧盟的市镇化或区域化成员国处理道德风险问题的方式可能为任何考虑超国家计划的决策者提供宝贵的见解。因此,欧洲的经验也非常重要。第三,任何欧洲计划都必须考虑到欧盟本身的各种劳动力市场治理。换句话说,整个E(M)U方案的设计应适应或至少承认其成员国的多样性。本文本身并不能代表欧盟成员国的全部多样性,它仅涉及可能的星座范围的子集。本文将按以下方式进行。首先,将建立一个理论框架,以理解多层劳动力市场治理体系固有的基本概念。其次,该理论框架将用于选择代表不同形式的多层治理模型的案例。第三,将分析案件的体制框架。从案例中获得的见解将与“结果”一章中的理论框架相结合。最后,将在上一章中概述进一步研究的结论和指示。

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