Not With Impunity: Assessing U.S. Policy for Retaliating to a Chemical or Biological Attack.

摘要

How should the United States determine its response to a chemical or biological attack against American personnel or interests. This paper assesses the current U,S reprisal policy known as 'calculated ambiguity' and concludes that today's policy does not contain enough substance to support strategy development. Current policy is designed to deter chemical and biological attacks by threatening an 'overwhelming and devastating' response, with the strong implication that nuclear weapons may be employed in the U.S. response. The current policy is inadequate because it lacks credibility, it fails to address proportionality, and it focuses on state actors, To improve the policy's efficacy, two clarifications are needed: make regime survivability the hallmark of the policy, and determine under what conditions nuclear weapons would be considered. The paper concludes by presenting an analytical framework for determining the U.S. response should deterrence fail.