Peacetime Tempo of Air Mobility Operations: Meeting Demand and Maintaining Readiness.

摘要

Although the September 11 terrorist attacks and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have led the Department of Defense (DoD) leadership to change its terms of reference for sizing and planning its force, these events have not changed the dual objectives of U.S. peacetime air mobility operations: to meet peacetime demand and to maintain wartime readiness. This study compares the peacetime tempo of air mobility operations in the Cold War (the 1980s) with that of the post-Cold War period (the 1990s) and examines the factors and as sociated trends that can affect the Air Mobility Command's (AMC's) ability to meet these dual objectives in a cost-effective manner. Does AMC have the flexibility to generate enough flying hours for pilot training when flying demand is low. Can AMC man flying operations with the number of pilots Congress has authorized. How well does the actual ratio of copilots (CPs) to aircraft commanders (ACs) match what is authorized. Comparing peacetime operations in the 1980s with those of the 1990s, did pilots get less hands-on training during flights in the latter period. Was AMC less able to project airlift demand accurately in the latter than in the former period. Did AMC have to fly more missions with shorter advance notice. Has AMC been successful in using reimbursements from its customers to defray its operating expenses. We will first report our findings on these factors and trends and will then suggest measures to correct the problems we have identified.