Achieving Unity of Effort at the Operational Level through the Interagency Process.

摘要

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has employed its armed forces in a host of contingency operations in countries such as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. More recently, the United States has undertaken operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the larger Global War on Terrorism. Throughout each operation, the military was not the lone instrument of national power employed in the region. As such, these operations have proved particularly complex as the U.S. military has experienced difficulty achieving unity of effort with other involved U.S. governmental agencies through the operational-level interagency process. This thesis tests the proposition of whether problems achieving unity of effort are due to the organizational structure of agencies functioning at the operational level, the operational framework wherein coordination takes place, or organizational culture. To help answer this question, this thesis will review the interaction of military and non-military organizations at the operational level during three operations: Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti (1994-1997), the Global War on Terrorism's Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (2001 to present), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2002 to present). Using Graham Allison's three conceptual models for analyzing governmental decision making, this study of the interaction of organizations through the interagency process will provide insight into where obstacles to unity of effort originate, and the potential ways in which they can be overcome.