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Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report. Direct Air Support Centers in I Corps July 1965 - June 1969

机译:项目CHECO东南亚报告。 1965年7月至1969年6月在I Corps的直接空中支援中心

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The system for control of tactical air assets in I Corps was an amalgam of the VNAF, USAF, and USMC tactical air control systems. These elements were brought together with the inception of the Single Management Concept on 10 March 1968. Prior to this date, the USAF and VNAF had run parallel systems from a joint Direct Air Support Center (DASC) at I Corps Headquarters in Da Nang, while the USMC had run an independent operation from their Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC) at the 1st Marine Air Wing (1 MAW) Headquarters compound on Da Nang Air Base. As the locations and strengths of U.S. Army and USMC forces shifted and changed throughout I Corps, the concept of Marines working only for Marines could not be sensibly justified within the integrated command structure that developed in I Corps. The need for Single Management became patently obvious after Tet and the siege of Khe Sanh during the winter of 1967 and spring of 1968. This report traces the development of the tactical air control system from the small Air Support Operations Center of 1962 to the complex structure that existed in December 1968. This report is one of several CHECO reports about the tactical air control systems in each of the four corps areas of South Vietnam. This report emphasizes the relationship among the many agencies involved with the command and control of air assets in I Corps. A detailed monthly analysis of response times has proved to be impossible, because of the lack of a meaningful and accurate data base for I Corps. However, the long-accepted guideline of approximately 40 minutes for scrambles and 20 minutes for diverts appears to have held up well. Army commanders have been unstinting in their praise of the support they received. The Marine commanders appear less satisfied. Nevertheless, the FACs in I Corps knew that in an emergency, they could expect air support both in time and in quantities sufficient to handle the situation.

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