Post-INF: Toward Multipolar Deterrence.

摘要

The NATO nations have never had enough conventional forces to deter the Soviets in Europe, and they have relied on NATO's nuclear forces--primarily American--for deterrence. As Soviet conventional and nuclear forces have grown larger and more threatening, the credibility of using U.S. nuclear forces in response to Soviet aggression in Europe has eroded. The decision to place U.S. Pershing II (PII) missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Western Europe was intended to bolster this credibility. The intermediate nuclear forces agreement, which removes these missiles, although necessary for political reasons, is likely to further erode the credibility of the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe. In the short run, some technical fixes could compensate somewhat for the removal of the PII and GLCM missiles. But, in the longer run, the current deterrence system, which relies on U.S. nuclear weapons to deter the Soviet Union, is likely to increasingly evolve toward a multipolar system including France, the United Kingdom and China, which possess growing nuclear arsenals playing a larger role in deterrence. Here we shall analyze the elements of deterrence and examine how U.S. nuclear forces have produced extended deterrence in Europe. Keywords: France; China. (KR)