PROJECT MATTERHORN: A Lesson in Strategy and Politics

摘要

MATTERHORN is the codename for B-29 operations out of China against strategictargets in Japan and Manchuria from June 1944 to January 1945. To date, most historians have condemned MATTERHORN as a total failure that diverted critical assets for little or no immediate military gain. However, this paper shows that MATTERHORN was conducted almost exclusively for strategic and political purposes; not for operational military gains. The strategic situation in the Pacific in early 1943 was characterized by a lack of unity of command that severely impacted strategic planning and resulted in a strategy of opportunism'. Army Air Force planners were intent on using the B-29 strictly as a strategic bomber and hoped it would prove air power prophet's predictions that air power can be a decisive element of war. President Roosevelt was determined to make China one of his four policemen that would make his post war vision of a new international order a reality. These three factors interacted to make a military poor course of action