首页> 外文期刊>Oil and Gas Reporter >Joint Operating Agreement: Maintenance of Uniform Interest Joint Operating Agreement: Risk Penalty Provision Farmout Agreement: Drill-to-Earn
【24h】

Joint Operating Agreement: Maintenance of Uniform Interest Joint Operating Agreement: Risk Penalty Provision Farmout Agreement: Drill-to-Earn

机译:联合经营协议:维持统一权益联合经营协议:风险罚款条款停产协议:钻研

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       

摘要

ExxonMobil and Valence are successors in interest to companies that executed a joint operating agreement (JOA) in 1983. The JOA contains a maintenance of uniform interest provision limiting their right to transfer or assign their interests. ExxonMobil succeeds to the operatorship of the JOA. In 1996, ExxonMobil enters into a farmout agreement with third parties giving them the right to drill a well to a depth sufficient to test the Cotton Valley Sand formation and to earn a working interest share out of ExxonMobil's interest. The farmees propose two new wells to Valence, a non-operating working interest owner. Valence does not respond since it did not know that the farmees had any relationship to the JOA. Valence, pursuant to the terms of the JOA, is treated as going non-consent as to these two wells and is assessed the contractually agreed-to risk penalty out of production. Valence does participate in three other wells proposed by the farmees "under protest." In March 1998, Valence sues ExxonMobil for breach of contract arguing that the farmout agreement violates the maintenance of uniform interest provision and for damages caused by its being treated as a non-consenting party to the initial two farmout wells. After a series of delays and Rule 11 agreements executed, Valence amends its petition after the date allowed for such amendments pursuant to the Rule 11 agreements. The trial court accepts the amended petition and holds for Valence. Held: affirmed. On the Rule 11 issue, the court finds that the trial court properly interpreted the applicable Rule 11 agreements as not precluding Valence from filing an amended petition when it did. While the JOA was modified by deleting the term "uniform" from the title of the maintenance of uniform interest provision, the court finds that the language that remained still requires that only a party's entire interest in all of the leases or an undivided interest in all leases may be conveyed. In this case the transfer of a portion of the interests in the leases covering only one of the formations included within the JOA area violates the amended JOA maintenance of interest provision. The farmout agreement expressly limits ExxonMobil's duty to convey to limited depths and formations. While the JOA does not require the maintenance of uniform interests, it does prohibit transfers of portions of leasehold interests which are what followed the execution of the farmout agreement. ExxonMobil also appeals the award of damages. There are two elements of the damages award, increased costs in drilling new wells to test the Cotton Valley Sand formation and the non-consent penalty set-offs against production for two of the farmout wells. The court affirms the damage award as to the cost of drilling since Valence presented evidence that it cost substantially more to drill new wells rather than use the existing well bores to achieve production from the Cotton Valley Sand formation. That increased cost which was passed on to Valence as part of its operating costs in the three farmout wells where it participated were consequential damages that could be recovered upon a finding that ExxonMobil, as operator, did not act reasonably or prudently. Likewise the court affirms the damage award relating to the non-consent or risk penalty that was imposed on the two farmout wells where Valence did not respond to the request toparticipate. By failing to comply with the JOA provisions imposing notice requirements on the operator to propose new wells, the non-consent provisions could not be triggered. The obligation upon Valence as a non-operating working interest owner can only be triggered by the required notice being properly given as stated in the JOA.
机译:埃克森美孚公司和瓦朗斯公司是1983年签署联合经营协议(JOA)的公司的利益继承者。该JOA包含统一的利益条款,限制了其转让或转让其利益的权利。埃克森美孚成功接管了JOA。 1996年,埃克森美孚与第三方签订了一项耕地协议,使他们有权钻探一口井,深度足以测试Cotton Valley Sand地层并从埃克森美孚的权益中获得应得的权益。农民向非经营性权益所有者Valence提议了两口新井。价表示不响应,因为它不知道农民与JOA有任何关系。根据JOA的条款,对于这两个油井,价被视为未获同意,并评估了合同约定的停产风险罚款。价确实参加了农民“抗议下”提出的另外三口井。 1998年3月,瓦朗斯(Valence)起诉埃克森美孚(ExxonMobil)违反合同,理由是该耕地协议违反了维持统一利息规定的规定,并因其被视为最初两个耕地井的非同意方而造成的损害。经过一系列的延误并执行了第11条协议之后,价牌在根据第11条协议允许此类修改的日期之后修改其请愿书。初审法院接受修改后的请愿书,并保留价。举行:肯定。在第11条问题上,法院认为,初审法院正确解释了适用的第11条协议,并不排除价格在这样做时提交修改后的请愿书。虽然JOA的修改是从维持统一利息条款的标题中删除了“统一”一词,但法院认为,保留的用语仍要求只有一方在所有租赁中的全部权益或在所有租赁中的未分割权益。可以转让租赁。在这种情况下,仅涵盖JOA区域内包括的一个编队的租赁中的部分权益的转让就违反了经修订的JOA维持利息规定。耕作协议明确限制了埃克森美孚的责任,即只能将其传达到有限的深度和地层。尽管JOA不需要维持统一的权益,但确实禁止转让租赁协议执行后的部分租赁权益。埃克森美孚公司也对损害赔偿提出上诉。损害赔偿金包括两个要素:增加新的油井以测试棉谷砂地层的测试成本,以及对其中两个农用油井的产量不同意的违约金抵销。由于Valence提供的证据表明,钻新井而不是使用现有井眼来获得Cotton Valley Sand地层的开采成本要高得多,因此法院对损害赔偿金的裁决予以肯定。所增加的成本转嫁给了瓦朗斯,这是瓦伦斯参加的三个油井的运营成本的一部分,因此产生了相应的损失,一旦发现埃克森美孚(作为运营商)没有采取合理或审慎的行动,就可以追偿。同样,法院确认了与瓦伦斯未响应参与要求的两个农用井所施加的未经同意或风险惩罚有关的损害赔偿。由于不遵守JOA规定,即要求操作员提出新井的通知要求,因此无法触发未同意的规定。只有在JOA中正确给出所需的通知后,方可触发Valence作为非经营性权益所有人的义务。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号