The Invalidity of the Distinction Between Inherent and Noninherent Ethical Concerns

摘要

In a thoughtful and well-argued target article about the bioethics of deep brain stimulation (DBS), Johansson and colleagues (2014) argued that it is not sufficient to consider present-day technology; it also is-necessary to consider the development of technology in the future. To handle both categories of technology, Johansson and colleagues invoked their main distinction between inherent and noninherent bioethical concerns, upon which their argument hinges. The distinction is that inherent bioethical concerns are not potentially capable of being addressed by scientific or technological advances, whereas noninherent bioethical concerns are. According to this dichotomous distinction, scientific or technological advances may render noninherent bioethical concerns to be mitigated or solved whereas the inherent ones will remain important. If the distinction between inherent and noninherent bioethical concerns were valid; the remainder of the target article would follow reasonably, and I would have no objections. In contrast, I next demonstrate that the basic distinction is not valid.