Is There Really a Concept Called 'Inherent Ethical Concern'?

摘要

In their well-informed article "Thinking Ahead on Deep Brain Stimulation: An Analysis of the Ethical Implications of a Developing Technology," Johansson, Garwicz, Kanje, Schouenborg, and Halldenius (2014) draw a distinction between so-called inherent ethical concerns (IEC) and noninherent ethical concerns (N-IECs) with regard to deep brain stimulation (DBS). The authors claim that this distinction might be helpful to discuss ethical concerns related to DBS more accurately because it would make it easier to identify those concerns related to a particular technology that potentially could be overcome in the future and those concerns that are inseparable from the respective technology. The argumentation of the article rests on the core assumption that DBS is defined by "(a) an electronic device (b) chronically implanted in the brain (c) stimulating the brain to alter brain function." If those conditions are not met, the authors stress, "the intervention would no longer be DBS."