首页> 外文期刊>Chaos, Solitons and Fractals: Applications in Science and Engineering: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science >Investor behavior, information disclosure strategy and counterparty credit risk contagion
【24h】

Investor behavior, information disclosure strategy and counterparty credit risk contagion

机译:投资者行为,信息披露策略和对手信用风险传染

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

Counterparty credit risk caused by the excessive expansion of credit derivatives is becoming more and more prominent. The study of evolution mechanism of its contagion will help the financial regulators set up a scientific and accessible prevention and control strategy. From the cross perspective of behavioral finance and information economics, this study analyzes the mechanism of counterparty credit risk contagion. Based on the epidemic model, a network model of it is built with the consideration of investor behavior and information disclosure strategy. The network topology characteristics of it are analyzed in theory. Meanwhile, this study analyzes the evolution characteristics of it in numerical simulation. The main conclusions are as follows: First, investor behavior or information disclosure strategy only affects counterparty credit risk contagion in local credit asset network, while it is gradually disappearing in global credit asset network. Second, noise can enhance the impact intensity of investor behavior or information disclosure strategy on counterparty credit risk contagion, and lead to the spread of counterparty credit risk synchronously in local and global credit asset networks. Third, information transmission rate has "local strengthening effect" on investor behavior. The timing of information release and the tendency of information disclosure exert a "global suppression effect" on the influence of investors, and the ability of investor information decision-making has a "local suppression effect" on the timing of information release and the tendency of information disclosure. Through the comprehensive adjustment of investor behavior and information disclosure strategy, the goal of preventing and controlling counterparty credit risk contagion can be realized in local and global credit asset networks. (c) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:对信贷衍生品过度扩张引起的交易对手信用风险变得越来越突出。其传感器的进化机制研究将有助于金融监管机构建立科学和可访问的防止和控制策略。从行为金融和信息经济学的十字视角,本研究分析了对手对手信用风险传染的机制。基于流行病模型,通过考虑投资者行为和信息披露策略,建立了一个网络模型。理论上分析了它的网络拓扑特征。同时,本研究分析了数值模拟中它的演化特性。主要结论如下:第一,投资者行为或信息披露策略只影响当地信用资产网络中的对手信用风险传染,而在全球信用资产网络中逐渐消失。其次,噪音可以提高投资者行为的影响力或信息披露策略对交易对手的信用风险传染,并在当地和全球信用资产网络中同时导致交易对手信用风险的传播。第三,信息传输率对投资者行为有“局部加强效应”。信息释放的时间和信息披露的趋势对投资者的影响产生了“全球抑制效应”,投资者信息决策的能力在信息释放的时机和趋势上具有“局部抑制效应”信息披露。通过全面调整投资者行为和信息披露策略,可以在地方和全球信用资产网络中实现预防和控制交易对手信用风险传染的目标。 (c)2018年elestvier有限公司保留所有权利。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号