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Comments on 'Active monetary policy, passive fiscal policy and the value of public debt: Some further monetarist arithmetic'

机译:评论“主动货币政策,被动财政政策和公共债务的价值:进一步的货币主义算法”

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This very interesting and topical paper deals with the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. The model assumes an active monetary policymaker and a passive fiscal policymaker, which means that the monetary policymaker actively controls infla tion whereas the fiscal policymaker takes the behavior of the monetary policymaker as given. The paper has a flavor of the Unpleasant Monetary Arithmetic (Sargent and Wallace, 1981) and the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (Woodford, 2001). These two str ands analyze the possible consequences of undisciplined fiscal policy for the outcomes of monetary policy and offer a rationale for central-bank independence or imposing constraints on fiscal policy like the ones that are incorporated in the Maastricht T reaty. Von Thadden takes the desirability of such constraints as given and looks at the consequences of two different monetary policy regimes for the fiscal policymaker operating under such constraints.
机译:这篇非常有趣且具有话题性的论文探讨了货币政策与财政政策之间的相互作用。该模型假设一个积极的货币政策制定者和一个消极的财政政策制定者,这意味着该货币政策制定者可以主动控制通货膨胀,而财政政策制定者则按照给定的货币政策制定者的行为行事。该论文具有令人不快的货币算术(Sargent和Wallace,1981)和价格水平的财政理论(Woodford,2001)的风格。这两个方面分析了无纪律的财政政策对货币政策结果的可能影响,并为中央银行独立或对财政政策施加了限制(如纳入马斯特里赫特条约)提供了理论依据。冯·萨登(Von Thadden)考虑了上述限制的合意性,并研究了两种不同的货币政策制度对在这种限制下运作的财政政策制定者的后果。

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