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The curse of knowledge in reasoning about false beliefs

机译:虚假信念推理中的知识诅咒

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Assessing what other people know and believe is critical for accurately understanding human action. Young children find it difficult to reason about false beliefs (i.e., beliefs that conflict with reality). The source of this difficulty is a matter of considerable debate. Here we show that if sensitive-enough measures are used, adults show deficits in a false-belief task similar to one used with young children. In particular, we show a curse-of-knowledge bias in false-belief reasoning. That is, adults' own knowledge of an event's outcome can compromise their ability to reason about another persons beliefs about that event. We also found that adults' perception of the plausibility of an event mediates the extent of this bias. These findings shed light on the factors involved in false-belief reasoning and are discussed in light of their implications for both adults' and children's social cognition.
机译:评估其他人知道和相信的内容对于准确理解人类行为至关重要。幼儿发现很难对错误的信念(即与现实冲突的信念)进行推理。这种困难的根源是一个充满争议的问题。在这里,我们表明,如果使用足够敏感的措施,成年人在虚假任务中就会表现出缺陷,类似于幼儿。尤其是,我们在错误信念推理中表现出对知识的诅咒偏见。也就是说,成年人对事件结果的了解会损害他们推理他人对事件的看法的能力。我们还发现,成年人对事件合理性的感知介导了这种偏见的程度。这些发现揭示了错误信念推理中涉及的因素,并根据它们对成人和儿童的社会认知的影响进行了讨论。

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