Are Proximity Attacks a Threat to the Security of Split Manufacturing of Integrated Circuits?

摘要

Split manufacturing is a technique that allows manufacturing the transistor-level and lower metal layers of an integrated circuit (IC) at a high-end, untrusted foundry, while manufacturing only the higher metal layers at a smaller, trusted foundry. Using split manufacturing is only viable if the untrusted foundry cannot reverse engineer the higher metal layer connections (and thus the overall IC design) from the lower layers. This paper studies the effectiveness of proximity attack as a key step to reverse engineer a design at the untrusted foundry. We propose and study different proximity attacks based on how a set of candidates are defined for each broken connection. The attacks use both placement and routing information along with factors which capture the router's behavior such as per-layer routing congestion. Our studies are based on designs having millions of nets routed across nine metal layers and significant layer-by-layer wire size variation. Our results show that a common, Hamming distance-based proximity attack seldom achieves a match rate over 5%. But our proposed attack yields a relatively small list of candidates which often contains the correct match. Finally, we propose a procedure to artificially insert routing blockages in a design at a desired split level, without causing any area overhead, in order to trick the router to make proximity-based reverse engineering significantly more challenging.