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Online ballot stuffing: Influence of self-boosting manipulation on rating dynamics in online rating systems

机译:在线投票填充:自增强操作对在线评分系统中评分动态的影响

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Vendors on online shopping platforms have incentives to provide misinformation by manipulating consumer ratings. However, few studies have empirically examined whether temporal self-boosting rating manipulation changes the follow-up dynamic pattern of online ratings. This study empirically identifies manipulated ratings and examines how this manipulation influences the evolution of follow-up ratings over time. Rating records of more than 30,000 restaurants are extracted from the server log of a restaurant review website. The results show a statistically nonsignificant difference in the average rating scores between before and after manipulation, indicating that manipulation does not influence follow-up rating dynamics. Moreover, the difference in average ratings between before and after manipulation decreases within a long time window, which indicates that the long-term effect is weaker than the short-term one. The results are further validated by an online field experiment. We then construct a simulation model to reveal the underlying mechanisms of why the follow-up raters could correct the bias of rating manipulation. The manipulated high-rating score of the vendor will increase the diversity of consumers' individual preferences, which leads to diverse evaluations among users. The aggregation of online ranking by taking the average score of ratings helps form a decentralized climate of opinion and finally helps correct the biased rating. This study challenges the common belief that self-boosting misinformation affects the performance of online commerce. The non-significant effect of rating manipulation on rating dynamics echoes the theory of the wisdom of crowds. Furthermore, this study has managerial implications for both online vendors and online rating platforms. We suggested that the system should degrade social influences among users in order to reduce the possible impacts by manipulated ratings.
机译:在线购物平台上的供应商有动机通过操纵消费者评级来提供错误信息。但是,很少有研究从经验上检验时间自我提升评分操纵是否会改变在线评分的后续动态模式。这项研究从经验上确定了操纵评级,并研究了这种操纵如何影响随时间变化的跟进评级。从餐厅评论网站的服务器日志中提取了30,000多家餐厅的评分记录。结果显示,在操作前后,平均评分得分在统计学上无显着差异,表明操作不影响后续评分动态。此外,操纵前后的平均等级之差在很长的时间范围内减小,这表明长期效果要弱于短期效果。通过在线现场实验进一步验证了结果。然后,我们构建一个仿真模型,以揭示后续评估者为何可以纠正评分操纵偏差的潜在机制。供应商的高评分操作将增加消费者个人偏好的多样性,从而导致用户之间的评估多种多样。通过获取评分的平均评分来汇总在线排名有助于形成分散的意见氛围,并最终有助于纠正偏见的评分。这项研究挑战了人们的普遍观念,即自我增强的错误信息会影响在线商务的绩效。评分操纵对评分动态的非显着影响呼应了人群智慧理论。此外,该研究对在线供应商和在线评级平台都有管理意义。我们建议该系统应降低用户之间的社会影响力,以便通过操纵评分来减少可能的影响。

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