首页> 外文期刊>IEEE transactions on systems, man, and cybernetics. Part A, Systems and humans >Game and Information Theory Analysis of Electronic Countermeasures in Pursuit-Evasion Games
【24h】

Game and Information Theory Analysis of Electronic Countermeasures in Pursuit-Evasion Games

机译:追逃游戏中电子对策的博弈与信息论分析

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

Two-player pursuit-evasion games in the literature typically either assume both players have perfect knowledge of the opponent's positions or use primitive sensing models. This unrealistically skews the problem in favor of the pursuer who needs only maintain a faster velocity at all turning radii. In real life, an evader usually escapes when the pursuer no longer knows the evader's position. In our previous work, we modeled pursuit evasion without perfect information as a two-player bimatrix game by using a realistic sensor model and information theory to compute game-theoretic payoff matrices. That game has a saddle point when the evader uses strategies that exploit sensor limitations, whereas the pursuer relies on strategies that ignore the sensing limitations. In this paper, we consider, for the first time, the effect of many types of electronic countermeasures (ECM) on pursuit-evasion games. The evader's decision to initiate its ECM is modeled as a function of the distance between the players. Simulations show how to find optimal strategies for ECM use when initial conditions are known. We also discuss the effectiveness of different ECM technologies in pursuit-evasion games.
机译:文献中的两人逃避游戏通常要么假设两个玩家都对对手的位置有完全的了解,要么使用原始的感知模型。这不切实际地使问题更偏向于追求者,该追求者只需要在所有转弯半径上都保持更快的速度即可。在现实生活中,逃避者通常在追赶者不再知道逃避者的位置时逃脱。在我们之前的工作中,我们通过使用逼真的传感器模型和信息理论来计算博弈论的回报矩阵,将没有完美信息的追逃行为建模为两人双向矩阵博弈。当逃避者使用利用传感器限制的策略,而追逐者依靠忽略感知限制的策略时,该游戏具有一个障碍。在本文中,我们首次考虑了多种类型的电子对抗(ECM)对追逃游戏的影响。逃避者启动其ECM的决定是根据玩家之间的距离进行建模的。仿真显示了如何在已知初始条件的情况下找到最佳的ECM使用策略。我们还将讨论在逃避游戏中不同ECM技术的有效性。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号