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A decision-making framework to integrate maintenance contract conditions with critical spares management

机译:将维护合同条件与关键备件管理相集成的决策框架

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Maintenance outsourcing is a strategic driver for asset intensive industries pursuing to enhance supply chain performance. Spare parts management plays a relevant role in this premise since its significant impact on equipment availability, and hence on business success. Designing critical spares policies might therefore seriously affect maintenance contracts profitability, yet service receivers and external providers traditionally attempt to benefit separately. To coordinate both chain parties, we investigated whether the spare components pool should be managed in-house or contracted out This paper provides a decision-making framework to efficiently integrate contractual conditions with critical spares stockholding. Using an imperfect maintenance strategy over a finite horizon, the scheme maximizes chain returns whilst evaluating the impact of an additional part to stock. As result, an original joint value -preventive interval and stock level - sets the optimal agreement to profitably allocate the components pool within the service contract Subsidization bonuses on preventive interventions and pooling costs are also estimated to induce the service provider to adjust its policy when needed. The proposed contractual conditions motivate stakeholders to continuously improve maintenance performance and supply practices, thus obtaining higher joint benefits.
机译:维护外包是资产密集型行业追求提高供应链绩效的战略驱动力。备件管理在此前提下起着重要的作用,因为它对设备可用性和业务成功具有重大影响。因此,设计关键备件策略可能会严重影响维护合同的获利能力,但是服务接收者和外部提供商通常会尝试单独受益。为了协调双方,我们调查了备用零件库应在内部管理还是外包管理。本文提供了一个决策框架,可以有效地将合同条件与关键备件库存整合在一起。在有限的时间内使用不完善的维护策略,该方案可在评估附加零件对库存的影响的同时,最大化链条收益。结果,原始的联合价值-预防间隔和库存水平-设定了最佳协议,以在服务合同内以有利的方式分配组件池。针对预防性干预措施的补贴奖金和池成本也被估计为诱使服务提供商在需要时调整其政策。拟议的合同条件激励利益相关者不断改善维护绩效和供应实践,从而获得更高的共同利益。

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