Poxy models and rash decisions

摘要

The second-to-last case of smallpox was diagnosed on August 24, 1978, when Janet Parker, a photographer at the University of Birmingham Medical School (Birmingham, U.K.), was admitted to the hospital. She had been infected when a virus escaped from the school's smallpox laboratory. On September 6th, Professor Henry Bedson, who was responsible for the laboratory, killed himself. Five days later, Janet died in the hospital. Although many people were exposed to her before the diagnosis, Janet infected only her mother (who survived). The incident shows that fears of the accidental release of smallpox are certainly justified. The variola virus is now officially stored at two locations (one in Russia and one in the United States), and there are concerns that covert stocks may also exist. The events of September 11th, 2001, and the deliberate releases of anthrax in the weeks that followed, led many to believe that the chance of a bioterrorist attack with variola had previously been underestimated. In the event of the deliberate or accidental release of smallpox, what should be done? Would isolation of cases suffice to control an outbreak? Would it also be necessary to trace and vaccinate contacts of cases?